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ABSTRACT
Under Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations, nancial institu-
tions are required to verify the identity and assess the trustworthi-
ness of any new client during on-boarding, and maintain up-to-date
records for risk management. ese processes are time consuming,
expensive, typically have sub-par record-keeping steps, and disad-
vantage clients with nomad lifestyle. In this paper, we introduce
KYChain as a privacy-preserving certication mechanism that al-
lows users to share (certied) up-to-date KYC data across multiple
nancial institutions. We base KYChain on immutable ledgers and
show that it oers condentiality and certication compliance of
KYC data.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Know your customer, or simply KYC, is a regulated process [14, 15]
requiring nancial institutions (FIs, e.g., banks) to verify identities
and check transactional behaviours of their clients to facilitate de-
tection of suspicious activities (e.g. money laundering). Typical
implementations of KYC compliance require customers to provide
due dilligence information to their FIs, starting with initial per-
sonal information during the on-boarding stage and reporting any
subsequent updates while their business relationship exists. Re-
cent studies show that an on-boarding process can take up to 32
days/customer, greatly impacting the overall KYC compliance costs,
which can be up to $20k/year [16] for each new client. ese costs
are then passed to customers in the form of high transaction fees.
Moreover, inadequate handling of KYC data (e.g. duplicate or con-
fusing requests, and lack of common KYC standards from dierent
FIs) have lead to 12% of corporate clients changing their FI in 2017
[13]. ere is a spread of commercial KYC services (e.g., Trulioo,
Pegasystems, LexiNexis, Deloie KYC Start) oered by companies
that operate on customer’s data and assist FIs in the verication
process. ese solutions do not allow re-use of KYC data across
multiple FIs and more importantly do not provide users with full
control over their KYC data, a key requirement behind recent GDPR
regulations. More recently, some commercial KYC services (e.g.,
Coinrm, Tradle, KYC Legal) have adopted blockchain technologies
and proprietary mechanisms to facilitate secure exchange of due
diligence information between multiple FIs. ese services must
still be trusted with condentiality of the customer’s KYC data.
e few existing academic approaches focus either on re-using
certied KYC data from one FI to another without re-certication,
but do not provide condentiality [17], or by sharing the KYC data
in a private-preserving manner with FIs that perform their own
certication [7].
Contribution. We propose KYChain, a privacy-preserving cer-
tication protocol that enables secure sharing of up-to-date KYC
data across multiple FIs and is fully controlled by the clients. At
the core of KYChain is an immutable ledger that stores hashes of
(encrypted) KYC data and certicates that are issued for a particular
customer. e corresponding ciphertexts encrypting KYC data and
certicates obtained from other FIs are encrypted and stored in an
o-chain storage. e client keeps decryption keys, which can be
issued to FIs with whom the client wishes to establish or maintain
a business relationship. e immutable ledger helps to keep track
of all user-submied changes for the KYC data. FIs can monitor the
ledger to identify which KYC data has been updated and request
keys from the customer to obtain these updates. In contrast to
[7, 17], KYChain can help to reduce the on-boarding time of new
clients through the possibility of reusing (certied) KYC data across
multiple FIs. is would reduce costs associated with the ongoing
monitoring of changes to KYC data by the FIs through automated
detection of updates on the ledger and o-chain storage. KYChain
can be oered as a service by an entity who would be running the
o-chain storage without jeopardizing condentiality of customer’s
data. Furthermore, we dene the security properties that enforce
guarantees over condentiality of the KYC data and authenticity of
certication for KYC data compliance.
2 KYCHAIN MODEL AND REQUIREMENTS
2.1 Entities: Clients, Ledger, Certiers
Clients. We model KYC clients by their unique personal identier
upi, e.g., name and personal numeric code or passport number. is
unique upi is used upon registration to assess the actual identity of
the client and avoid fraudulent registrations. Clients then generate
their own private/public key pair, and can use their public key as a
cryptographic identity in the system. Moreover, we allow clients
to register multiple public keys as long as they are linked to their
upi. is registration is handled by trusted certiers who keep log
of matched public keys and upi.
Public Ledger. KYChain adopts a distributed public ledger with
an assumed o-chain storage for the records. Clients will store their
KYC related data and obtained certicates in an encrypted form
o-chain with corresponding hashes commied into the ledger to
guarantee integrity. For simplicity, we model this ledger/storage
combination as a single entity that realises an append-only list and
adds a timestamp to each record it receives. Additionally, we assume
that search queries can be performed over the ledger and the o-
chain storage based on timestamps and the information contained
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in commied records. Formally, we dene the public ledger PL
=(Setup, Time, Append, Search) with the following algorithms:
Setup (λ): pp. Initializes the append-only list, starts the tamper-
proof clock, and returns the public parameters pp;
Time ( ): time. Returns the current time from the internal clock;
Append (rec): t-rec ∪ {⊥}. Returns either a valid timestamped
record t-rec = (time, rec) for the input rec received at
time time← Time(); otherwise an error symbol ⊥;
Search (query): Tlist. Returns a list of timestamped records
Tlist that satisfy the search requirements in query.
Public Ledger with external database. For ease of description, we
refer to the public ledger as a single entity PL. However, we con-
sider a hybrid approach for the public ledger instantiation, with
an external database DB for storage and a public blockchain BL for
integrity. More precisely, for each record rec submied by a client,
the timestamped record t-rec = (time, rec) is rst recorded by DB
and its hash H(t-rec) is then commied into the blockchain BL.
is approach allows clients and certiers access to a search func-
tionality, performed over the database DB, and extract timestamped
records. Furthermore, only clients can update or remove their KYC
data from the database. We can use Ethereum and Bitcoin as existing
implementation for our blockchain. More details on the setup are
provided in Section 3.2.
Certiers. Clients commit into the ledger some digital representa-
tion of their KYC data, e.g., scans of passports, ID cards, utility bills,
photographs, etc. A certier interacts with the client to verify that
their digital information matches the clients’ personal identier
upi. If this check is successful, the certier produces a certicate
aesting to the correctness of the client’s KYC data. We assume
that each certier has some policy Ψ dened over KYC data and
that certicates are issued only if client’s KYC data A satises the
certier’s policy, i.e., Ψ(A) = 1. We assume that all eligible certiers
are trusted and publicly known to all parties in the system.
2.2 KYC Data and Certicates
KYC Data. We follow a specic template when modeling the
KYC data:
kyc-data = (pk, type, data, certL, accL)
• pk is the public key of the client that submits this KYC
data;
• type describes what type of KYC data it is, e.g., passport,
id card, location, occupation, bills, etc. ;
• data is a digital copy of the KYC data;
• certL is a list of all certicates issued for this KYC data.
• accL enumerates all certiers that can access the client’s
KYC data. e list starts empty, and then gets updated by
the client.
Linking KYC Data with the Ledger. KYChain does not process
private information of the clients. Given some kyc-data = (pk,type,
data,certL,accL), the client rst encrypts its KYC data, certicates
and certiers, and adds an authenticator to prove the origin. is
results in the KYC data record of the form:
rec = (pk, rid, type, cdata, ccertL, caccL, auth) (1)
• rid is a unique identier for this record;
• cdata is a ciphertext resulted by encrypting the value
data;
• caccL is a list of ciphertexts resulted from encrypting the
certiers from accL;
• ccertL is a list of ciphertexts formed by encrypting the
obtained certicates from certL;
• auth is an authenticator over (type, cdata, ccertL, caccL),
that can be publicly veried using client’s public key pk.
e ledger stores timestamped records built on the records clients
submit. For simplicity, we adapt the notation t-rec =(time, rec) to
t-rec = (pk, time, rid, type, cdata, ccertL, caccL, auth) (2)
• time is the time the record has been received.
2.3 KYChain Certication Scheme: Denition
e core of KYChain are rigorous protocols for establishing the
identity of potential clients, measuring their degree of trustwor-
thiness, and continued monitoring for risk assessment. We mirror
the on-boarding process of a client with some FI by subsequent
registration and certication of their KYC data performed by the
FI. In addition, KYChain introduces a verication mechanism that
allows clients to authenticate and share their certied KYC data
with other FIs to speed up the eventual on-boarding process with
them. rough the use of ledgers that store encrypted KYC data
and certicates, previously authorized certiers would be able to
monitor changes to the client’s KYC data and obtain updates using
the same authorization mechanism as in the on-boarding phase.
Denition 2.1 (KYChain Certication and Data Sharing). e
protocol KYChain (PL) = (Setup, RegisterU, SubmitU, Certify,
Verify) has access to the ledger PL, and consists of the following
algorithms:
Setup (λ): pp. Initializes the ledger PL by calling its setup algo-
rithm, denes the list of certiers, and publishes the public
parameters of the protocol pp.
RegisterU (pp, upi): (pk, sk). Client U generates locally a public-
secret key pair (pk,sk), then he submits to certier C the
public key pk with his personal identier upi. Certier C
validates upi, then stores (pk,upi).
SubmitU (pp,sk, kyc-data): t-rec. Client U (pk,sk) builds a record
rec as described in Equation (1) and calls PL.Append (rec).
Ledger PL veries that pk is registered, and that auth is
valid w.r.t pk. Aer a successful verication, PL computes
t-rec according to Equation (2), with time← PL.Time( ).
Finally, PL stores t-rec locally, before sending a copy to U.
UpdateU (pp, sk,rid,[data′], [accL′], [certL′]): t-rec′. Client U
(pk, sk) uses this algorithm to update the timestamped
record t-rec indexed by rid with one or more of the
following: data′, accL′, desc′. Client U retrieves t-rec
from PL, extracts the initial kyc-data, and updates it to
kyc-data′ with changed data. en, it performs t-rec′ ←
SubmitU(pp, sk, kyc-data′).
Certify(pp, skU, skC,Ψ) : 〈U(cert), C(cert)〉. It is an interactive
algorithm run between client U(pkU, skU) and the certier
C(pkC, skC), with C establishing policy Ψ. Both parties have
access to the information stored in PL.
2
Exp
dc,β
A,KYChain(upi, λ)
1 : pp← Setup(λ); (sk∗, pk∗) ← RegisterU(pp, upi)
2 : Log← {(sk∗, pk∗, upi)}
3 : (type, data0, data1, certL, accL) ← AO1 (pp, pk∗)
4 : t-rec← SubmitU(pp, sk∗, type, dataβ , certL, accL)
5 : β ′ ← AO2 (t-rec)
6 : return (β ′ = β ) ∧ A did not call Oprf(pk∗, pkC, Ψ) with
t-rec ∈ Search(Ψ, pk∗) ∧ A did not call Ocor(pk∗)
(a) Data Condentiality with A = (A1, A2).
ExpccA,KYChain(upi, λ)
1 : pp← Setup(λ); (sk∗, pk∗) ← RegisterU(pp, upi)
2 : Log← {(sk∗, pk∗, upi)}
3 : AO,Ocert(pp, pk∗)
4 : 4.1 : return A made call to Ocert(·) with cert← CertifyC(pp, pk∗, ·, Ψ)∧
4.2 : true← Verify(pp, pk∗, Ψ, cert) ∧ ¬Ψ(∅) ∧ A is not running Oprf(·) ∧
4.3 :
( A did not call Ocor(pk∗) ∨
¬Ψ(A) for A = {t-rec = (pk∗, ·)| for t-rec added by Osubmit to PL}
)
(b) Certication compliance.
Figure 1: Security Properties, for O = {Oreg, Ocor, Osubmit, Oupdate, Oprf }.
• CertifyU(pp, skU, pkC,Ψ) is run by client U by inter-
acting with CertifyC to authenticate and show com-
pliance with the policyΨ. e algorithm returns either
a valid certicate cert, or abort with ⊥;
• CertifyC(pp, skC, pkU,Ψ) run by certier C s.t. inter-
acting with an authenticated and policy compliant U
it produces a certicate cert for this client; otherwise
aborts with ⊥;
Verify(pp, pkU,A,Ψ, cert) : bool. Run by any party that has ac-
cess to the certicate cert, and used to verify that client
U(pkU, ·) has a valid certicate cert over policyΨ that is sat-
ised by set A of KYC data. Typically, the verier obtaines
the certicate and KYC data following an authorisation
from the client.
2.4 Security Properties
As security guarantees for our protocol, we focus on data conden-
tiality for the client’s KYC data, and certication compliance.
Oracles. For our experiments we consider that the adversary
can register multiple clients, but is challenged on a single client
U(pk∗, sk∗) generated by the experiment. e adversary can directly
interact with the ledger PL, and call all algorithms oered by PL
with the exception of Setup, therefore, we do not model them as
oracles. Moreover, the verication can be performed by anyone.
Given the protocol KYChain, we have the following list of oracles,
that an adversary can access:
• Oreg (upi): pk. Calls (pk, sk) ← RegisterU(pp, upi), stores
(pk,sk,upi) internally in Log, and returns pk.
• Ocor (pk): sk. Finds in (pk, sk, upi) ∈ Log, and returns sk.
• Osubmit (pk,kyc-data): t-rec∪{⊥}. Finds (pk, sk, upi) ∈
Log, and returns t-rec← SubmitU(pp, sk, kyc-data). Oth-
erwise, it returns the error symbol ⊥.
• Oupdate (pk,rid,·): t-rec′∪{⊥}. It searches for (pk, sk, upi) ∈
Log, and if no such entry is found it returns ⊥. Otherwise,
it returns t-rec′ ← UpdateU (pp, sk, rid, ·).
• Oprf(pkU, pkC,Ψ): cert. Both pkU and pkC have to be in
Log. e adversary plays the role of a malicious certier
pkC by interacting with CertifyU(pp, pkU,Ψ).
• Ocert(pkU, pkC,Ψ) : cert. e adversary plays the role of
a malicious client pkU by interacting with CertifyC(pp, skC,
pkU,Ψ). Preliminarily, both pkU and pkC are veried to be
registered.
Data Condentiality. Intuitively, the timestamped records in the
ledger should not leak information about their data with the ex-
ception of the meta-information, i.e, type, time and public key. We
model this property using a PPT adversary A = (A1,A2) that
needs to distinguish between two dierent KYC data by seeing a
timestamped record for one of them in the ledger. More precisely,
for a client (sk∗, pk∗, upi) the adversary selects 2 dierent KYC
data: data0 and data1, and receives the timestamped record of
dataβ for a xed bit β ∈ {0, 1} unknown to the adversary. e
adversary has access to the functionalities of KYChain: register, sub-
mit, update and prove KYC data (via oracles Oreg,Oadd, Oupdate,
Oprf), together with the ability to corrupt (by calling oracle Ocor).
e adversary wins if he can provide a guess β ′ such that β = β ′
under the condition he didn’t ask for the secret key of the client
(pk∗, sk∗, upi) (using the corruption oracle Ocor) and didn’t ask
ask for a decryption of the timestamped record t-rec (using the
proof oracle Oprf). We formalize this property in Figure 1a. is
property can be extended to show condentiality for the access list
accL, and credential list certL.
Denition 2.2 (Data Condentiality). KYChain satises data con-
dentiality, if for any PPT adversary A and any upi, the following
advantage is negligible in λ:
AdvdcA,KYChain =
Pr [Expdc,βA,KYChain(upi, λ) = 1 ] − 12  .
Certication Compliance. Honest certiers would only be able to
create certicates for authenticated clients that satisfy their policy.
In Figure 1b, we model a PPT adversary A that needs to convince
a certier to create a valid certicate (that can be veried) when he
doesn’t satisfy the policy, or when he impersonated another client
or certier. e adversary is given access to registration, submis-
sion, update and prove KYChain functions (via oracles Oreg,Oadd,
Oupdate, Oprf, Ocert), and the capability to corrupt (with oracle
Ocor). We exclude trivial policies, Ψ (∅)=1, and restrict the adver-
sary not to run Ocert and Oprf simultaneously.
Denition 2.3 (Certication Compliance). KYChain ensures cer-
tication compliance, if for any PPT adversary A the following
3
RegisterU (pp, upi)
1 : (pk, sigk) ← DS.KGen(λ)
2 : seed←$ {0, 1}λ
3 : sk = (pk, sigk, seed)
4 : RLog← RLog ∪ {(pk, uid)}
5 : return (pk, sk)
Verify(pp, pkU,A,Ψ, cert)
1 : for (pkU, time, rid, type, cdata,
certL, caccL, auth) ∈ A
if ¬DS.Vrfy(pkU, (type, cdata,
certL, caccL), auth)
then abort
2 : return DS.Vrfy(pkU, A, cert) ∧
Ψ(A)
SubmitU (pp,sk, kyc-data)
1 : (pk, sigk, seed) ← sk
2 : (pk, type, data, certL, accL) ← kyc-data
3 : if ¬(pk, ·) ∈ RLog then return ⊥
4 : rid←$ {0, 1}λ
5 : for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} do ki ← PRFseed(pk, rid, i)
6 : cdata← SE.Enc(k1, data)
7 : ccertL← SE.Enc(k2, certL)
8 : caccL← SE.Enc(k3, accL)
9 : auth← DS.Sign(sigk,
(type, cdata, certL, caccL))
10 : rec← (pk, rid, type, cdata, certL,
caccL, auth)
11 : t-rec← PL.Append(rec)
12 : return t-rec
UpdateU (pp, sk,rid,[data′], [accL′], [desc′])
1 : (pk, sigk, seed) ← sk
2 : t-rec← PL.Search(rid)
3 : if ¬(pk, ·) ∈ RLog ∨ t-rec = ⊥ then return ⊥
4 : (pk, time, rid, type, cdata,
certL, caccL, auth) ← t-rec
5 : for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} do ki ← PRFseed(pk, rid, i)
6 : if data′ , ⊥ then data← data′
else data← SE.Dec(k1, cdata)
7 : if certL′ , ⊥ then certL← certL′
else certL← SE.Dec(k2, certL)
8 : if accL′ , ⊥ then accL← accL′
else accL← SE.Dec(k3, caccL)
9 : kyc-data′ ← (pk, rid, type, data,
certL, accL)
10 : t-rec← SubmitU(pp, sk, kyc-data′)
11 : return t-rec
Figure 2: e RegisterU, SubmitU, UpdateU and Verify algorithms.
advantage is negligible in λ:
AdvccA,KYChain = Pr
[
ExpccA,KYChain(λ) = 1
]
.
3 KYCHAIN SCHEME: OUR CONSTRUCTION
3.1 Cryptographic Building Blocks
Our system relies on standard cryptographic primitives that have
classic security properties. We employ pseudo-random functions
PRF : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}? → {0, 1}poly(λ) [12], digital signature scheme
DS = (KGen, Sign, Vrfy) [10] that are existentially unforgeable un-
der chosen message aack (EUF-CMA), and a symmetric encryption
scheme SE =(KGen,Enc, Dec) with two security requirements: indis-
tinguishability under chosen plaintext aack (IND-CPA), and wrong-
key detection (WKD) [8]. e WKD property states that any ecient
adversary cannot successfully decrypt a ciphertext with a key dif-
ferent from the one used to encrypt it: Dec(k ′, Enc(k,m)) = ⊥ for
k , k ′.
3.2 Generic KYChain Scheme
We provide an overview of our construction and how it integrates
with KYC. We formalize the RegisterU, SubmitU, UpdateU, Verify
algorithms in Figure 2, and the interactive algorithm Certify in
Figure 3.
e setup phase is initialized by a trusted third party that starts
the ledger PL and denes the list of certiers, accessible to all.
We consider a hybrid approach for the public ledger instantiation:
external database for storage and a public blockchain for integrity.
We can use existing public run blockchains, i.e., Bitcoin or Ethereum,
and have each certier C maintain its own local database DBC. Any
record rec submied by a client to a certier, with be submied
as a timestamped record t-rec in its local database DBC. en, the
certier would send the timestamped record as a transaction to the
public blockchain. In this scenario the certier would be paying
the transaction fee, associated to that transaction. Certiers can
optimize this process, and collect records from multiple clients
received in a single day, and create a single transaction for all of
them.
Remark 1 (Alternative Public Ledger Setup). e above setup
method has the advantage of being easily deployable with current
FI infrastructure. However, an alternative would be to deploy a per-
missioned blockchain, with the certiers acting as nodes. at is, the
certiers would be trusted to submit transactions to the rest of network.
is would remove the need for transaction fees, but would require
dierent trust assumptions, as certiers would have the power to block
or alter transactions. More likely, rigorous auditing mechanism would
be needed to ensure certiers do not or have not deviated from the
protocol steps.
To ease description we use a single RLog list with the public
keys and personal identication number of all registered clients,
that only certiers can access. When joining the system, clients
generate their own verication-signing keys (pk, sigk) together
with a value seed used to derive unique symmetric keys used to
encrypt each KYC data. Clients register by submiing their public
key pk together with their personal identity upi to the certier
pkC. Once a client’s identity is veried the RLog is updated with
(pk,upi).
In practice, each certier C(pkC, skC) would have their own list
RLogC and would only share the public keys they have registered, to-
gether with personal identication of known untrustworthy clients
or countries, i.e. black/grey lists [6, 11, 18]. In case of honest clients
no personal information is shared between dierent FIs. How-
ever, by sharing personal identier of untrustworthy clients any
FI would be able to block accounts and request resolution for their
own clients deemed untrustworthy by other FIs.
4
CertifyU(pp, skU, pkCΨ) with skU = (pkU, sigkU, seedU) CertifyC(pp, pkU, skCΨ) with skC = (pkC, sigkC, seedC)
1 : K ← ∅; L ← Search(Ψ, pkU) A← ∅; L ← Search(Ψ, pkU) 2
3 : for (pkU, time, rid, type, cdata, certL, caccL, auth) ∈ L for (pkU, time, rid, type, cdata, certL, caccL, auth) ∈ L 4
5 : if ¬DS.Vrfy(pkU, (type, cdata, certL, caccL), auth) if ¬DS.Vrfy(pkU, (type, cdata, certL, caccL), auth) 6
7 : then abort then abort 8
9 : else
k1 ← PRFseedU (pkU, rid, 1)
K ← K ∪ {k1 }
10 : K
for 0 ≤ i ≤ |L | do 11
(pkU, time, rid, type, cdata, certL, caccL, auth) ← L[i] 12
A← A ∪ {(type, time, SE.Dec(K [i], cdata)) 13
if ¬Ψ(A) then abort 14
cert← DS.Sign(skC, A) 15
16 : return cert cert return cert 17
Figure 3: e Certify interactive algorithm. A preliminary step consists of verifying that both parties are registered. All
communications are performed over an authenticated and condential channel.
Remark 2 (Offline and Online registration). Online regis-
tration requires clients to ll online forms that contain their phone
number, full name, current living address. is is coupled with a
scan of their valid identity card or passport, and a recording that
clearly shows their face. Certiers check the validity of KYC data via
communication with competent authorities, e.g. police, and verify
that the person recorded matches the person on the scan KYC data.
Further steps can be performed to enhance this process by validating
the information in the recording w.r.t. their information on the form
or scanned KYC data.
Oine registration is performed by certiers that have physical
location, e.g. banks, and assess the client face-to-face w.r.t. their KYC
data. en, they carry the registration online in the name of the client,
who receives a private key at the end of the process.
Registered clients can submit any KYC data kyc-data =(pk, type,
data, certL, accL), by building a record rec dened as in Equation
(2). As part of this process, a unique record identier rid←$ {0, 1}λ
is dened, and the unique symmetric keys are produced by
ki ← PRFseed(pk, rid, i),
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. en, the ciphertexts (cdata, ccertL, caccL) are
produced by calling the symmetric encryption scheme SE with
key k1 over data, key k2 for certL, and k3 for accL. Finally, DS
is applied over (type, cdata, ccertL, caccL) to obtain signature
auth, and build record rec that is appended to the ledger PL.
Certication is done interactively between a client U(pkU, skU)
and a certier C(pkC, skC). Intuitively, the client provides the certi-
er with access to the KYC data and the certier provides a signature
over this set of KYC data. e authorization is performed through
giving decryption keys for the encrypted KYC data that are logged
in the ledger. First, the list of timestamped records L for latest
versions of the KYC data of client pkU that satisfy the policy Ψ are
taken from the ledger by both parties. en, the client provides
decryption keys for the data of all timestamped records in L to C.
e certier signs all KYC data, and sends the certicate to the
client. If the timestamped records are invalid, i.e., their signature
does not verify, or the client does not satisfy the policy, the certier
aborts.
Verication consists of checking that the certicate is valid
w.r.t. KYC data provided. e list of KYC data can be provided
by the client with the verier additionally checking their times-
tamps against the ones in the ledger, or they can be extracted from
the ledger by following Steps 1-8 from Figure 3. is would allow
clients with a nomadic lifestyle to benet from the same rights as
all other clients.
We allow clients to update KYC data they have submied, by
submiing new records. If clients do not have access to their initial
KYC data, they can use their KYC data record identier rid, retrieve
the timestamped record t-rec logged in the ledger, and extract the
KYC data kyc-data using decryption keys ki ← PRFseed(pk, rid, i),
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Based on the values that client intends to update,
i.e, the data data, or list of certicates certL, or access list accL,
the system would create a new KYC data kyc-data′ where the
required elds have been updated, and carry a new submission
with kyc-data′.
To satisfy customer due diligence requirements FIs need an in-
depth knowledge of their clients to reason about their trustworthi-
ness and likelihood of being involved in illegal activities. Changes
in clients’ lives, e.g., identity documents, occupation, address, etc,
would be reected by updates to the timestamps of the correspond-
ing KYC data records in the ledger. FIs are able to get these updates
through the same authorisation mechanism that they used to get
access to client’s KYC data during the onboarding phase.
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3.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 3.1. e KYChain construction in Section 3.2 oers data
condentiality, if SE is IND-CPA and PRF is a pseudo-random func-
tion.
Proof. Using unique keys derived via PRF to encrypt each KYC
data together with the IND-CPA property for SE provides sucient
guarantees for data condentiality.
Game G0: We dene experiment G0 as the data condentiality
experiment Expdc,βA,KYChain(upi, λ). erefore, we trivially have
Pr[G0 = 1] = Pr
[
Exp
dc,β
A,KYChain(upi, λ) = 1
]
.
Game G1: We dene experiment G1 as the experiment G0, except
we replace
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} do ki ← PRFseed(pk, rid, i),
from Osubmit (line 5 of SubmitU) with
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} do ki ← {0, 1}λ .
is change should be undetected to the adversary, due to the
pseudo-randomness property of the PRF. erefore, for n Osubmit
oracle queries, it holds that
|Pr[G0 = 1] − Pr[G1 = 1]| ≤ 3n × AdvprfB(A),PRF.
Reduction to IND-CPAGame: Finally, we show that G1 can be
reduced to IND-CPA of the symmetric encryption scheme. e IND-
CPA adversary B(A) performs Steps 1-6 from game G1, except for
Step 4 where he uses the encryption IND-CPA oracle query Oenc(·).
More precisely, he executes Steps 1-4 and 7-12 from SubmitU, and
replaces Step 5-6 with:
5 : for i ∈ {2, 3} do ki ← PRFseed(pk, rid, i)
6 : cdata← SE.Oenc(data)
e key k1 is not generated, and the encryption of the KYC data
is replaced with an oracle encryption. Moreover, B(A) does not
need to handle decryption queries as line “Adid not call Oprf (pk∗,
pkC,Ψ) with t-rec ∈ Search(Ψ, pk∗)” makes these type of requests
forbidden. e probability of A to win game G1 is identical with
the probability of B(A) to win the IND-CPA experiment:
Pr[G1 = 1] = Pr
[
Expind−cpaB(A),SE(λ) = 1
]
.
As the advantage of an adversary is dened as the value greater
than a random guess, i.e. 1/2, we have that the advantage of A in
G1 is |Pr[G1 = 1] − 1/2|. erefore, the following holds:Pr[G1 = 1] − 12
 ≤ Advind−cpaB(A),SE.
e result of this theorem follow. 
Theorem 3.2. e KYChain construction in Section 3.2 oers cer-
tication compliance, if DS is EUF-CMA, SE is WKD, and PRF is
pseudo-random function.
Proof. is security experiment measures the capabilities of
an adversary to convince an honest certier to issue an certicate
either when the adversary is impersonating an honest client that
may satisfy the policy, or when the adversary doesn’t satisfy the
policy. We split this experiment into two sub-experiments based
on the winning condition of the adversary:
• Exp1: the adversary impersonating an honest client. is
experiment is identical to ExpccA,KYChain(λ), except that line
4.3 is replaced with
4.3 : A did not call Ocor(pk∗) (3)
• Exp2: the adversary doesn’t satisfy the policy. is experi-
ment is identical to Exp1, except that line 4.3 from Eq. (3)
is replaced with
4.3 : ¬Ψ(A) for A = {t-rec = (pk∗, ·)|
for t-rec added by Osubmit to PL} (4)
Transition to Exp1 and Exp2: e advantage of adversary A
is bounded by the above two probabilities, such that:
AdvccA,KYChain ≤ Pr[Exp1 = 1] + Pr[Exp2 = 1] .
Bound Exp1: In this experiment the adversary wins if he can
produce sucient keys K (Step 8 in Figure 3) and send them over
an authenticated and condential channel. e adversary can eas-
ily collect valid keys by acting the role of a certier and running
Oprf with the client U(pk∗, sk∗). However, he would not be able to
send this set of keys over an authenticated channel, unless he can
break the authentication property. Note that the denition does
not consider Man-in-the-Middle aackers. erefore, we have:
Pr[Exp1 = 1] ≤ AdvauthB,Channel.
Bound Exp2: Similar to experiment Exp1, the adversary needs
to produce sucient keys K (Step 8 in Figure 3) that would be used
to decrypt KYC data (Step 11 in Figure 3) that satises the certier
policy. However, the KYC data submied by the adversary or client
does not satisfy this policy. erefore, the adversary can win if he
submits one KYC data and can decrypt it to a dierent valid KYC
data.
Game G1: e experiment G1 is identical to Exp2, except the key
derivation from Osubmit (line 5 of SubmitU):
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} do ki ← PRFseed(pk, rid, i),
is replaced by the following key generation
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} do ki ← {0, 1}λ .
e probability of the adversary to distinguish this change is bounded
by the pseudo-randomness property of the PRF, for n Osubmit ora-
cle queries:
|Pr[Exp2 = 1] − Pr[G1 = 1]| ≤ 3n × AdvprfB(A),PRF.
Bound on G1: For adversary A to produce a dierent KYC data,
he needs to compute a key k′1 that decrypts a cyphertext obtained
by encrypting with a dierent key k1 , k′1. is reduces to the
adversary breaking the WKD property of the symmetric encryption
scheme.
Pr[G1 = 1] ≤ AdvwkdB(A),SE.
e result of this theorem follows. 
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3.4 Practical Aspects in Building KYChain
Typically, the on-boarding process is time consuming and costly
both for nancial institutions and their clients. ese aspects can
be even higher when taken together with inadequate handling of
KYC data. KYChain intends to reduce these numbers signicantly
by performing the on-boarding a single time and re-using the certi-
cation from one FI to another. Furthermore, KYChain comes with
a continuous monitoring system that allows FI to timely identify
updates in their clients KYC data and request permission to view it.
e current estimates show FI spend 32 days/customer and upto
$20k/year for each client [16]. ese would only need to be sup-
ported at the rst on-boarding for a client, as any additional on-
boarding can be done by sharing the (certied) KYC data.
Time for submiing KYC data. Clients submit encrypted KYC
data to certiers, that is then stored locally in a database. en, a
hash of the new database records are sent as a transaction to the
public blockchain, i.e., Ethereum or Bitcoin. On average, Ethereum
takes 15 seconds [4] to append a new block with multiple transac-
tions, while Bitcoin takes 10 minutes [1]. To consider a transaction
irreversible, a number of additional blocks have to be added aer
the block that contains that transaction: 12-250 for Ethereum [9],
and 2-6 for Bitcoin [3]. In the case of Ethereum, a KYC data trans-
forms in a irreversible transaction in 10 minutes (15 seconds times
40 blocks). For Bitcoin, the time is longer at 40 minutes (10 minutes
times 4 blocks).
Costs for submiing KYC data. Certiers are supporting the trans-
action fees associated to submiing KYC data and certicates. Per
block the Ethereum transaction fees is $0.22 [5], while the Bitcoin
transaction fee is $0.49 [2]. Certiers can optimize their costs by
puing transactions together, and paying that block transaction
fee per day, instead of per transaction.
4 CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduce KYChain, a privacy-preserving certi-
cation protocol for KYC data, that allows clients to securely share
(certied) KYC data from one FI to another. To ensure integrity, we
use a public blockchain with an external database to store encrypted
(certied) KYC data. Clients have control over what KYC data is
stored and with whom it is shared. Moreover, our system allows
clients to update or remove any KYC data submied. KYChain can
signicantly reduce time and costs with monitoring of changes to
KYC data by the FIs through automated detection of updates in
the ledger, and the on-boarding time by accepting certications
made by other FIs. We show that KYChain oers guarantees over
condentiality of the KYC data and authenticity of certication for
KYC data compliance.
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